Walter Stöhr

Development from Below: the Bottom-up and Periphery-inward Development Paradigm

Paper

Interdisziplinäres Institut für Raumordnung
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien
Vorstand: o.Univ.Prof.Dr.Walter B.Stöhr
A-1190 Wien, Hasenauerstraße 42/8, Tel.(0222) 34-43-19

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Walter B. Stöhr

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Development from Below: the Bottom-Up and Periphery-Inward Development Paradigm [x)]

Walter B. Stöhr

Interdisciplinary Institute of Urban and Regional Studies, University of Economics

Vienna

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Introduction

The paradigm of development "from below", like that "from above" is not, as might be assumed, simply related to the level at which decisions on development are taken. A change in level of decision-making is a necessary but not a sufficient - and possibly not even the most important - condition for such a strategy. Development "from below" implies alternative criteria for factor allocation (going from the present principle of maximizing return for selected factors, to one of maximizing integral resource mobilization); different criteria for commodity exchange (going from the presently-dominating principle of comparative advantage, to one of equalizing benefits from trade); specific forms of social and economic organization (emphasizing territorial rather than mainly functional organization; cf.Friedmann and Weaver, 1979) and a change in the basic concept of development (going from the present monolithic concept defined by economic criteria, competititve behaviour, external motivation and large-scale redistributive mechanisms, to diversified concepts defined by broader societal goals, by collaborative behaviour and by endogenous motivation).

Development would need to be considered again as an integral process of widening opportunities for individuals, social groups and territorially-organized communities at small and intermediate scale, and mobilizing the full range of their capabilities and resources for the common benefit in social, economic and political terms. This means a clear departure from the primarily economic concept of development held in the 1950s and 1960s with its ensuing pressure on individuals, social groups and territorially-organized communities to develop only a narrow segment of their own capabilities and resources as determined "from above" by the world system, and neglecting other capabilities and self-determined objectives in order to retain a competitive position in economic and political terms vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

Unlike development "from above", which was nurtured by the economic theories of the past three decades (particularly the neo-classical one), there seems to be no well-structured theory available as yet for an alternative paradigm of development "from below". Some efforts in this direction have been undertaken: at international level by the search for a New International Economic Order (Tinbergen et al., 1976), or for "another development" (Nerfin, 1977); at the sub-national level by such concepts as Agropolitan Development (Friedmann-Douglass, 1978), Ecodevelopment (Sachs, 1976), and the search for a "theory of rural development" (Haque et al., 1977). But there is still a pressing need for a coherent and systematic framework for an alternative approach. One reason for the lack of such a coherent framework may be that it would need to be supported by a variety of disciplines and not primarily by economics - as our present theory suggests - and the cumulative co-operation between different disciplines is apparently very difficult to achieve. In addition there may not be only one strategy of development "from below" - as has been the case for the predominatly monolithic industrialization-urbanization strategy "from above" to date. Beyond some basic common features, different cultural areas will need to construct their own development strategies which will require compatibility only at certain points of mutual contact. Alternatively, the contact points may need to be restricted to those types of interaction where compatibility is feasible and desired by each of them. Alternative strategies of development "from below" need to emerge from and be adapted to the requirements of different cultural areas. Such strategies may change over time, possibly alternating with phases of development "from above". The traditional development paradigm "from above", a center-down-and-outward paradigm, provides a starting point in the search for alternatives.

The past three decades, dominated by development strategies "from above", have not led to decreased disparities in living levels. Disparities have in general increased as many

of the case studies in this book show. This applies both to disparities between social strata (Adelman and Morris, 1973) and between geographical areas (Stöhr and Tödtling, 1977).

Both paradigms are conceptual constructs which in practice rarely occur in pure form. Real situations will always (especially in today's highly interactive national, continental and world-wide systems) consist of a mix of both these elements. In different national or regional situations there is undoubtedly considerable variation in the make-up of these two elements as well as in their temporal sequence.

Let me briefly contrast the two concepts with each other in more-or-less pure form.

A REAPPRAISAL OF THE "CENTRE-DOWN" PARADIGM

As Hansen (Chapter 1)[x] has shown, the concept of development "from above" assumes that development, whether spontaneous or induced, starts only in a relatively few dynamic sectors and geographic clusters, from where it will (or hopefully should) spread to the remaining sectors and geographic areas. This "trickle-down" process is essentially supposed to start at the global level (from world-wide demand, or world innovation centres), and then filter down and outward to national or regional units, either through the urban hierarchy (Berry, 1972), through input - output relations (Perroux, 1955), or through the internal channels of multi-plant business organizations (Lasuén, 1973; Pred, 1977), or large-scale government organizations.

Its emphasis therefore has been on urban and industrial, capital-intensive development, the highest available technology, and maximum use of external and scale economies. This usually involves: large investment projects; increasing scale of the private and public organizations required to transmit development through these integrated units; large redistributive mechanisms; and the reduction of economic, social, cultural, political and institutional

x) see book-quotation on cover page.

"barriers" (including distance friction and institutional differentiation), which might hinder transmission effects within and between these units.

The hypotheses upon which the paradigm of development "from above" is based, explicitly or implicitly, are: (1) development in its economic, social, cultural and political dimensions can be generated only by some very few select agents such as Schumpeter's (1934) entrepreneurial pioneer, the white, the urbanite, or the intellectual; (2) the rest of the population are considered "incapable of initiatives in making improvements, consequently everything must be done for them ..." (Uphoff and Milton, 1974:28-29); (3) these few agents are able and willing to allow all others to participate in this development within a reasonable time-span and on a reasonably equal basis; (4) these other groups are able and willing to adopt the same type of development; (5) the specific type of development (economic, social, cultural and political) initiated by the few select agents is the most suitable one for all the other members of the increasingly-interactive system and should therefore replace other existing notions of development; (6) the (socially and culturally) new and the (economically and politically) more powerful notions of development are also the "better" ones and therefore the ones which the rest of society strives for. Essentially it therefore presumes an eventually monolithic and uniform concept of development, value systems and human happiness, which automatically or by policy intervention will spread over the entire world.

These notions are related very closely to the interests of the large-scale (private or government) organizations which were installed to serve as the "motor" of development. In many cases however these have in turn come to dominate the system, very often overruling the interests of those - e.g. local and regional communities - they were meant to serve. This has led to a high concentration of power in a few private or governmental organizations which now dominate the greater part of the world system. At the same

time such a strategy ignores or overrules: (1) the great diversity of value systems and aspirations created by the differences - often historically grown and territorially defined - between cultural systems; (2) the great variations in natural conditions (which in part have brought about the latter); (3) the fact that with different aspirations and cultural and natural preconditions, the imposition of a uniform concept and measurement of development is bound to relegate some groups to what is today called "under-development", leaving them further away from those set standards and plunging them still further into the role of the disadvantaged in any measurement of standards as defined by the dominant culture or group - as has been shown in another context (Stöhr-Tödtling, 1978); (4) that this subsequently leads to differing levels of "dependence" as has also been shown in the latter paper. Once such economically-disadvantaged groups start to interact more intensively with the more developed ones on the latters' terms, they are increasingly forced to adopt the same social, cultural, political and institutional norms in order to try to compete with them in economic terms, economics being the medium through which most large-scale interactions are channelled; (5) that this entails the subordination of broader societal and cultural values to economic determinants, a fact that can be observed in most highly-developed countries today.

The alternative would be for economically less-developed social groups and areas to give clear priority to their own self-determined societal standards, and to subordinate external economic and other interactions to these standards. This increasingly is being demanded in fact by developing countries which are beginning to demand some form of collective self-reliance and which view increased nationalism as an important component of a "new meaning of development" (Seers, 1977).

Normally, large-scale organizational linkages between areas of greatly differing levels of development lead (due to

factors such as unequal distribution of power, selective factor withdrawals, unequal terms of trade, unequal distribution of scale economies) to increasing spatial divergence rather than a convergence of living levels. In other words, even with explicit regional development policies operating through large-scale private or public organizations, the sum of backwash effects in most cases still seems to exceed spread effects.

With a "centre-down"development strategy this can only be avoided if at the national level there is both a strong control mechanism avoiding leakages to the exterior (a control on commodity and factor flows) and a strong internal redistributive mechanism with broad public participation. In large countries the same mechanisms might also be necessary at sub-national levels, to avoid major concentrations of power. Few developing countries seem to have been willing (or able) to do this so far, and it will be interesting to see the evaluation of respective experiences, particularly those of some of the more inward-looking developing countries of a socialist type to be presented in the present book.

DEVELOPMENT "FROM BELOW"

Development "from below" would require the control of the backwash effects of development "from above" mentioned before and the creation of dynamic development impulses within less developed areas. The crucial question is how these two requirements can be fulfilled. The first requires changes in the interaction between different regions and countries and will be treated here; the second requires the creation of endogenous factors of change for increased equity and developmental dynamics, and shall be considered in a later section of this chapter.

Instead of optimizing selected factor components in a

"centre-down" fashion on a large (national or international) scale, thus "creaming" the human and natural resources of favoured segments of (national or regional) economies (Hansen, Chapter 1)[x], the basic objective of development from below is the full development of a region's natural resources and human skills (what Richardson, 1973, calls "generative" growth), initially for the satisfaction in equal measure of the basic needs of all strata of the population, and subsequently for developmental objectives beyond this. Most basic needs services are territorially organized, and manifest themselves most intensely at the level of small-scale social groups and local or regional communities. Development "from below" therefore would require that the greater part of any surplus (created through production specialization within an area) should be invested regionally for the diversification of the regional economy. By Region here we mean the smallest territorial unit above the rural village where such activities are still feasible (cf.also Friedmann and Douglass, 1978 on "agropolitan districts"). This process is then envisaged to occur at successively higher scales. Through retention of at least part of the regional surplus, integrated economic circuits within less-developed regions would be promoted (Santos, 1975; Senghaas, 1977) and development impulses would be expected to successively pass "upward" from the local through regional to national level. Policy emphasis therefore will need to be oriented towards: territorially-organized basic needs services, rural and village development, labour-intensive activities, small and medium-size projects, technology permitting the full employment of regional human, natural and institutional resources on a territorially-integrated basis.

The basic hypotheses underlying a strategy of development "from below" are the following:

(1) major regional disparities in living levels have emerged as the negative consequences of large-scale economic integration through the withdrawal effects

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x) see book quotation on cover page

mentioned above. Previously regional civilizations developed independently, achieving broadly similar levels of material progress (Abdalla, 1978, p.19). Population distribution adjusted to the long-term resource potential of individual regions (except for unforeseen natural disasters) and the social mechanism on the whole retained a man-resource balance.

(2) There are many concepts of development depending on the natural environment of different communities and the development over time of specific cultural and institutional conditions. In fact, these represent major factors of development potential and should not be subordinated to the short-term pressures of any externally-dominated or "anonymous" market mechanism.

(3) The basic impulse for formulation and implementation of such differentiated concepts of development must come from within the respective communities. This requires discarding the presently-dominant hypothesis that small-scale (local, regional or national) communities can develop only through the intermediary of other more highly-developed communities or countries, and must do this by applying the latter's - usually materially defined - concept of development. Discarded also must be the presently-dominant hypothesis that in order to achieve this, poor communities must produce more commodities for demand of the rich ones (the export-base concept) at reduced cost and return to their own factors (mainly labour and natural resources) and in return, must receive transfers of capital, technology and organizational skill ("development aid") from the more developed countries. These factor transfers, along with withdrawal of natural resources and unequal terms of trade, actually weaken rather than strengthen the comparative development potential of less-developed areas. They also reduce the respective communities' capacity to mobilize their own capital,

technology and organizational skills, thereby making them increasingly dependent on more developed areas.

(4) There should be greater national and regional self-determination of the degree and type of interaction needed in these territorial units. Most "less-developed" countries (as defined by developed countries' criteria) are under-developed mainly because of their reduced capability for formal large-scale interaction to provide goods and production factors for large-scale (international) interchange systems. Many such communities, however, have a much higher potential for informal small-scale interaction (interpersonal social relations, group identity, small-scale solidarity, active cultural participation) than have materially highly-developed areas. Such small-scale potential (related to Allardt's (1973) conditions of "loving" and "being") is important to human beings but is usually not interchangeable at larger scales. It has use-value, not exchange-value, and therefore does not enter into the calculations of "comparative advantage" on a large (world-wide) scale, and cannot be measured by our usual indicators of development. These potentials are however greatly affected - usually negatively - by economic, social and political transformations caused by a rapid integration into the world economy. This is visible in virtually all formerly colonial countries (Abdalla, 1978).

Since such small-scale potentials, often operating on an informal basis, are also important for such necessities as social security, health care, environmental protection and education, quality of life in these sectors is often detrimentally affected by factor withdrawals, or by rapid social transformations brought about by large-scale economic development. Usually the State has to intervene through large-scale cost-intensive institutions to compensate for the informal social mechanisms which had served such purposes before. But in less-developed countries this is

usually not feasible.

Development "from below" therefore may require a certain degree of "selective spatial closure" (Stöhr and Tödtling, 1978) to inhibit transfers to and from regions or countries which reduce their potential for self-reliant development. This could be done by control of raw material or commodity transfers which contribute to negative terms of trade and/or by control of factor transfers (capital, technology) which lead to under-employment or idleness of other regional production factors, or to major external dependence.

Instead of maximizing return of selected production factors on an international scale, the objective would be to increase the over-all efficiency of all production factors of the economically less-developed region in an integrated fashion. This integration of territorially available resources and social structures should form a basis for more internally-initiated development impulses.

Development of large-scale activities and centres will then primarily be based on territorially-defined local and regional inputs and demand, and will correspond to their requirements rather than the reverse. Large cities would not be able to grow as fast as they have in the past - which would help solve a key problem of spatial development in most developing countries. Benefits accruing from activities exceeding this scale would be subject to spatial redistribution, Hoselitz's (1957) dichotomy between "generative" and "parasitic" cities would be rephrased: cities would primarily generate activities for their immediate hinterland rather than for an abstract interurban system. In this way the hierarchical urban-industrial system would essentially be sustained "from below" by the relatively stable (human, social, political and environmental) needs and potential of their territorial hinterland and its population, rather than by the fortuitous and uncontrollable trickling-down of impulses "from above". Urban centres would develop primarily as a supportive component of their respective hinter-

lands, rather than the hinterland developing (as in the centre-down strategy), as a function of the selective requirements of the urban system.

The spatial pattern of urban-industrial development resulting from such strategies will be comparatively decentralized and regionalized. As industrialization and service growth are based primarily on demand and resources within their respective regions and are not primarily export base activities (which should be promoted later at successive stages), the urban system will tend to be more inward-oriented than the existing coastal patterns of developing countries which have resulted from the "centre-down" process. Urban centers will tend to maximize accessibility within their regions (on which their development primarily depends) rather than maximizing accessibility to the outside. Inward-oriented urban systems which maximize internal accessibility provide the best conditions for equal provision of basic needs services to all parts of the population. This corresponds to the urban pattern of those countries which were able to establish an urban system and an institutionally disaggregated (e.g. multi-tier federal) nation state before large-scale transport integration and industrialization took place.

A strategy of development "from below"would need to combine selected elements of what Hirschman (1958) called advantages of integration (or "surrender of sovereignty") with selected elements of advantage of separatism or "equivalents of sovereignty". "If only we could in some respects treat a region as though it were a country and in some others treat a country as though it were a region, we would indeed get the best of both worlds and be able to create situations particularly favorable to development" (Hirschman 1958, p.199). The question is how and whether this is possible.

The "advantages of integration" for less-developed areas would seem to lie particularly in free and self-determined access to technological and organizational innovation as

well as in access to potential markets for products surplus to their own need (Furtado, 1978).

The advantages of "equivalents of sovereignty" would seem to lie in cultural and institutional semi-autonomy of less-developed areas and in the possibility of a certain degree of "spatial closure" (Stöhr and Tödtling 1978) or a "cellular economy" (Donnithorne, 1972), in which barriers to free resource withdrawals, to negative terms of trade and a further concentration of power would be drawn along territorial lines at different hierarchical levels.

At least for a "cellular" socialist country such as China it is maintained that self-reliance together with decentralized planning (as introduced in 1975) did not reduce the development potential of the poorest regions, but "... seems to have narrowed ... interprovicial differentials ... even before the important state interprovincial transfer of funds have been taken into account" (Paine, 1976). It may well be that the mobilization of additional resources in the regions - beyond increasing the production and income of even poorer regions - may in fact increase aggregate growth and thereby make more funds centrally available for additional redistribution.

Apart from these rather fragmentary strategy elements, is there a more coherent theoretical or practical experience available to development processes "from below" ?

Dudley Seers in his paper "The New Meaning of Development" (1977) maintains that we still lack a theory for an alternative development paradigm:

> "... we do not yet understand much about what self-reliance implies for development strategies, but some of the economic aspects are obvious enough. They include reducing dependence on imported necessities, especially basic foods, petroleum and its products, capital equipment and expertise. This would involve changing consumption patterns as well as increasing the relevant productive capacity. Redistribution of income would help, but policies would also be needed to change living styles at given income levels - using taxes, price policies, advertising and perhaps

rationing. In many countries, self-reliance would also involve increasing national ownership and control, especially of sub-soil assets, and improving national capacity for negotiating with transnational corporations.

"There are other implications as well, especially in cultural policy. These are more country-specific, but as a general rule, let us say that 'development' now implies, inter alia, reducing cultural dependence on one or more of the great powers - i.e. increasing the use of national languages in schools, allotting more television time to programmes produced locally (or in neighbouring countries), raising the proportion of higher degrees obtained at home, etc. ..."

"On this approach, development plans would henceforward not put the main emphasis on overall growth rates, or even on new patterns of distribution. The crucial targets would be for (i) ownership as well as output in the leading economic sectors; (ii) consumption patterns that economised on foreign exchange (including imports, such as cereals and oil); (iii) institutional capacity for research and negotiation; (iv) cultural goals like those suggested above, depending on the country concerned .... "

"Of course, an emphasis on reducing dependence does not necessarily mean aiming at autarchy. How far it is desirable, or even possible to go in that direction, depends on a country's size, location and natural resources; on its cultural homogeneity and the depth of its traditions; On the extent to which its economy needs imported inputs to satisfy consumption patterns which have to be taken - at least in the short term - as political minima. The key to a development strategy of the type suggested is not to break all links, which would almost anywhere be socially damaging and politically unworkable, but to adopt a selective approach to external influences of all types." (Seers, 1977, p.5-6).

IN SEARCH OF A THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT "FROM BELOW": SOME HISTORICAL PARALLELS

Niles Hansen has shown that the theoretical foundations of development strategies "from above" as practiced during the past two decades stem mainly from the economic theory dominant during the last quarter of a century, strongly influenced by neo-classical economic thought. Such strategies are still widely considered a prerequisite for further

economic progress, although in view of the results produced, increasing doubts are being raised.

The lack of an alternative theory and practice for development "from below" which Seers alludes to, refers in fact only to the period of the last thirty years, however. It is true that during this period development "from above" has been the dominant paradigm in the theory and practice of economic policy in particular, and in the evolution of the two systems of super-powers in general. This was the case with respect to the Western hemisphere, in spite of the fact that one of the major assumptions of classical and neo-classical economic thought is individual and independent private decision-making - seemingly the extreme opposite of the mechanism of development "from above". This contradiction becomes clear in hindsight however, as classical or "positivistic" economics was concerned essentially with individual resource allocation for the production of "private goods" (Machlup, 1977); the increasingly important production of public goods for collective objectives, however, needs to focus essentially on external effects and therefore requires different allocation mechanisms. In the Eastern hemisphere, the Soviet model is by definition based on the operation of a monolithic central planning and redistributive mechanism "from above" which has increasingly been challenged by peripheral countries in the Socialist sphere of influence.

There have been many examples in previous periods however, under changing cultural and political conditions, of periods dominated by development "from below" intermittent with periods of development "from above", as we shall try to show has been the case in Central Europe. This has been done in spite of the fact that the present book deals mainly with Third World Countries, in order to show that the presently-dominant paradigm of development "from above" may not be as irreversible as it might seem in short-term perspective and from an isolated economic point of view-

The swing between these two approaches in the past seems to have been related to changing scales of societal interaction, to a changing subordination of rationalizing economic activity under broader societal norms (philosophical, religious, political, social, etc.), and more recently, to changing rates of economic growth. Let me give a few short - and necessarily overly simplified - examples. A concise and very pointed description of these changing trends including their spatial dimension for earlier periods is contained in Heinrich (1964), for more recent periods in Kondratieff (1926), Schumpeter (1939) and Lewis (1978). For this purpose I shall go back into the history of economic and societal thought much further than Niles Hansen has done in describing the centre-down paradigm dominant during the past 25 years:

Over the past 2.500 years the scale of societal and spatial interaction in specific cultural areas has changed at various times from periods dominated by small-scale societal interaction (from "below") to others dominated by large-scale interaction (from "above"). Along with these changes have gone changes in socio-political institutions from small to large-scale and vice-versa. Furthermore, they were usually associated with changes in the dominant power structure between different social, political and religious groups within the respective societies. More recently these changes have also been associated with major technological innovations (Schumpeter, 1939, Lewis, 1978). Periods of dominating small-scale spatial interaction ("from below") tended to be irrationally and metaphysically dominated; they focussed on what Tourraine (1976) calls "ideological" accumulation. Firmly subordinated under such explicit societal norms (metaphysical, institutional, social, cultural, ritual, etc.) of the respective territorial community were specific functional economic, technological and other rational activities or what Tourraine has called processes of "functional" accumulation. These small-scale economic and societal interaction

patterns (small-scale compared to those of preceding or following periods) might be explained by the fact that irrationally-based (emotionally, sensually-based) human interaction is limited to a much smaller scale than functional (abstract, rationally or economically-based) human interaction (Hall, 1966; Greenbie, 1976; Laszlo, 1977). Whereas the first kind of interaction takes place mainly in concrete (spatially delimitated) territorial space, the latter takes place primarily in abstract (functionally delimited) space (Friedmann and Weaver, 1979) and can therefore bridge distance much more easily. To put it in Allardt's terms, human conditions of "loving" and "being" depend much more on small-scale interaction, whereas the human condition of "having" benefits considerably from large-scale interaction.

Laszlo (1974) assumes a continuous increase in scale of spatial interaction throughout history, whereas according to our hypothesis spatial expansion has oscillated consicerably between rationally- and irrationally-dominated historic periods (see Fig.1).

In periods of dominating large-scale spatial interaction "from above", such as during the past 25 years, functional (rational, including economic and technological) activities gained considerable autonomy from broader societal norms (metaphysical, institutional, social, ritual, etc.), and often even became supra-ordinate over them. This usually was accompanied by a rapid acceleration in the rate of innovation in many fields including production, transport and communications technology. These innovations promoted the rapid expansion of interaction scales which only functional processes could readily bridge. These periods of development "from above", possibly due to the destabilizing effects of accelerated innovation (Laszlo), in general tended to be much shorter than the preceding or subsequent periods of development "from below". These changes seem to have oscillated around a long-term trend towards increasing

scales of interaction, which however was periodically reduced once more to smaller scale, and thereby prevented from moving ahead at a continually fast rate.

Figure 1 illustrates such periods of development "from above" and "from below". Samples are taken from specific periods in time and only from a relatively small part of the world: the Mediterranean and Central Europe. More profound analysis is required on these issues, particularly on the impact each of these periods has had on the living levels of the poorest population strata. It is hoped that the present hypotheses will arouse the interest of historians in undertaking more systematic studies of the interrelations between scale of socio-economic interaction, rate of economic growth and spatial disparities in living levels.

Fig. 1 : Changes in scales of spatial interaction
(Some historical European examples)



Periods (approximate):

Greek Polis	700 - 500 B.C.
Roman Empire	0 - 150 A.D.
Middle Ages	9th - 14th cent.A.D.
Mercantilism	turn 16th/17th cent.A.D.
Physiocrats	2nd half of 18th cent.A.D.
Classical period (rationalism) and 1st Kondratieff up-swing	turn 18th/19th cent.A.D.
Romanticism and 1st Kondratieff down-swing	early 19th cent.A.D.
2nd Kondratieff up-swing	1850 - 1873
2nd Kondratieff down-swing	1873 - 1895
Neo-classical period and 3rd Kondratieff up-swing	1895 - 1913
3rd Kondratieff down-swing	Inter-World War crisis
4th (Kondratieff) up-swing	1948 - (1973 ?)

Following are some of the examples (see also Figure 1):

Greek Polis:

In the Greek Polis, urban and economic development particularly in its initial phase was essentially self-reliant (sometimes even autarchic within city states) and rather rigidly subordinated to the philosophical framework of Nicomachean ethics and their norms of justice rooted in the works of Plato and Aristotle. The Polis was a narrowly delimited territorial unit usually without tendency towards contiguous expansion.
Instead, more-or-less rigidly organized city leagues were established. This period lasted for about half a millenium from the 7th century B.C. onwards.

Roman Empire:

During the first century and a half A.D. (Ceasar to Trajan), the Roman Empire (see Figure 1) created the first "world economy", with a comparatively well-organized monetary, credit and transport system, and relatively little subordination to metaphysical norms.

Middle Ages:

In the 3rd. and 4th centuries A.D. there followed a reversal to a large number of small-scale economic areas, a receding of the monetary and credit economy, and an increasing orientation towards agricultural and rural forms. During the Middle Ages (Figure 1) economic activities for over four centuries were subjected to a multiplicity of religious and social restrictions, with emphasis on the concept of individual and common "need" determining a just price ("justum precium"), prohibition on taking of interest on capital, etc.

The subjection of economic activities to philosophical, religious and social norms introduced important elements of solidarity (against those of competition), provided stability (against the dynamics of an autonomous economic process), and in general reduced the rate of societal change: the

relatively small-scale framework of the Greek Polis and the Medieval system lasted four or five centuries each; that of the Roman Empire only for one and a half centuries.

Mercantilism:

Towards the end of the Middle Ages, there occurred in Central Europe a change from the relatively self-contained, small-scale agricultural and rurally-dominated interaction patterns of the 12th and 13th centuries to the increasing interaction radii of Mercantilism (Figure 1). The latter was intended to serve "as a unifying system" attempting to overcome the "economic disintegration" caused by feudal powers, by the system of river tolls and road tolls, and by "local disintegration in other spheres" (Heckscher, 1955). It was based on state-guided promotion of handicrafts and urban-based trade which created decentralized urban-centred regional economies and in which rural areas became strictly subservient to their urban centres. In the Mercantilist period, for the first time, explicit economic policy by the state existed and was scarcely embedded in metaphysical norms. The major objective was to increase the wealth of the State as a whole by producing sufficient amounts of the goods required for nourishment, material needs and comfort of its inhabitants. The (aggregate) positive balance of trade became an overriding objective, oriented towards the development of the state's economic potential and reduction of foreign economic influence. Major instruments were the prohibition on import of final products, and export of raw materials and food products. All foreign commodities, particularly those serving "unnecessary luxury" rather than real needs, were banned from import and later were subjected to high tariffs. It was for the first time, though on a small scale, a centralist state-run policy to develop to the maximum the full economic potential of individual states. Emphasis was on urban activities in a larger national context to safeguard political independence. At the same time it was the period

when the first overseas colonial acquisitions were made by European countries.

Physiocrats:

As a reaction to the previous urban and handicraft-oriented state-run economic policy there emerged in the second half of the 18th century, particularly in Central Europe, the first partial laissez-faire policy of the "Physiocrats" (Figure 1). Laissez-faire principles, however, were mainly applied to commerce as their application in agriculture (the Physiocrats' key sector, according to Quesnay's Tableau Economique) would have made large rural regions idle. Free Trade thereby essentially fortified the power of the agricultural and administrative sectors. The directly-productive employment potential of cities was minimal as industrialization had barely started. Handicrafts and trade were considered "sterile" activities. At the same time the rural unrest of the Peasant Wars was still remembered. Tariff protection for agriculture, the key sector, was therefore a necessary exception to general laissez-faire attitudes, a restriction aiming at full employment of natural resources, especially of agricultural land.

Classical Free Trade Era and First Kondratieff Up-Swing :

Finally, towards the end of the 18th century the Englightenment (Figure 1), classical economic theory and the free-trade philosophy came into domination. By this time the chief country of origin of this doctrine, England had acquired sufficient initial advantage to benefit from such an economic arrangement. This coincided with the upswing of Kondratieff's (1926) first "long economic wave". Although Kondratieff's waves are mainly based on variables indicating economic expansion (prices, production, wages, etc.) they are also related to scales of spatial interaction (foreign trade). The initiation of Kondratieff's "long upswings" has been associated

> with the enlargement of world markets by assimilation of new (and especially of colonial) countries, with the application of important discoveries and inventions in the technique of production and communication, and by extensive wars and revolutions (Samuelson, 1978).
>
> Along with it in many European countries came the elimination of rigid institutional restrictions in the fields of artisanry and commerce (guilds), and in rural activities (feudalism). Previous small-scale interaction units were transformed into larger, internally increasingly uniform political entities: the nation states of France, England, Sweden and Russia in the 18th century; Germany, Italy and the U.S.A. in the 19th century, etc. These nation-states increasingly enlarged their areas of influence on non-European continents as well.

This period saw a major extension of European forms of development to other continents. In the previous Mercantilist and Physiocratic periods, colonies had mainly been considered as sources of prestige, monetary wealth (precious metals) and luxury goods (spices and tea, etc.), while their social and cultural systems on the whole were left intact with the exception of slave trade areas. With the emerging technological and industrial revolution in Europe in the latter part of the 18th century however, the role of colonies was increasingly transformed into becoming sources of raw materials for industry (cotton, wool, vegetable oils, jute, dyestuffs, etc.), and into potential markets for industrial products. In order to attain these objectives major social, cultural and legal changes were imposed upon the colonies by the motherland: (1) changes in existing land and property arrangements in the direction of private property, and the expropriation of land for plantation agriculture; (2) creation of a labour supply for commercial agriculture and mining, by means of forced labour, and by indirect measures aimed at generating a body of wage-seeking labourers; (3) spread of the use of money and exchange of commodities,

by imposing money payments for taxes and land rent and by inducing a decline in home industry; and (4) where the pre-colonial society already had a developed industry (e.g., cotton in India), a curtailment of production and export by native producers. These changes were perpetuated by the introduction of legal codes, administrative techniques and the culture and language of the dominant power, and the promotion of a local élite willing to co-operate with the colonial power (Magdoff, 1978). Industrialization had thus led to a socio-political and cultural penetration (i.e. a territorial disintegration) of the colonies. A similar process to this international one also occurred within most of these countries, in what has recently been termed "internal colonialism" (Hechter, 1978).

The economic sphere had finally liberated itself from centuries-old religious, ethical, social and institutional restrictions, and began to evolve as an autonomous field of activity. With rapid technological innovation and capital accumulation it turned from being a subject, into becoming a driving force for social, political, religious and environmental transformation. The broader societal and environmental spheres became relegated to the status of "externalities" of economic processes, both in the original motherland and successively also in the dependent colonies. Substituted for former principles of solidarity, satisfaction of basic needs, justice, and integrated resource mobilization, were new criteria of competition, efficiency, selective world-wide resource optimization, and survival of the fittest. Along with successive elimination of obstacles to increasing efficiency such as religious, ethnic and institutional barriers, came the reduction of state barriers and the introduction of a nationless and spaceless economic doctrine. Intra-national and international trade became institutionally less and less differentiated. Tariffs were discarded as distorting comparative advantage and discriminating between social classes (by presenting gifts to the landowners!). Other territorially-manifested "externalities" in spheres

such as environment, employment of human and natural resources, social conditions, etc., were increasingly neglected. It was assumed (as later also in neo-classical economics) that under conditions of perfect competition and full mobility of factors, private efficiency and social welfare would converge. Foreign competition would lead to modernization of national manufacturing, and the principle of comparative advantage would increase efficiency, reduce prices, and as a consequence also wages; increased capital accumulation and increasing radii of spatial interaction would further raise over-all efficiency. The transformation of economic structures (once embedded in stabilizing complex societal norms) had taken place, into economic processes now autonomous and spaceless. Devoid of institutional or other societal constraints, a process of quantitative growth but also of qualitative deterioration and instability at a rate never know before, had started.

In economic theory and policy, criteria for resource allocation such as "need" or "absolute cost" (locally or regionally manifested), were substituted by the concept of (world-wide) comparative advantage.

There were a number of important consequences:

(1) this concept cemented the dominance of economic criteria over "external" (social, cultural or environmental) criteria as described above;

(2) it promoted the systematic over- or under-exploitation of territorially-organized or less mobile resources, expecially land, human and institutional resources;

(3) it initiated an increasing exposure of local and regional communities to external (national and international economic, and other) influences. The level of development and the wealth of a regional or national community was no longer determined by the amount of resources (material, cultural, institutional, etc.) which this community was able to mobilize for the satisfaction of its own needs, but rather by the value attached (from outside)

to exportable segments of its resources in exchange for imported goods. The value of an imported commodity on the other hand was determined not by its local or regional production cost, but by the cost of export goods exchanged for it, and by the elasticity of national demand for foreign goods, compared to that of foreign demand for national goods (the equation of international demand, Mill, 1848). This meant that territorially-defined communities were not masters of their destiny any more, but had become subservient to the "objective" mechanism of worldwide commodity and factor markets and those national and international functional groups able to control them;

(4) it created and perpetuated situations of "under-development" along territorial lines, where following the previous argument, "less developed" regions or countries in order to develop had to reduce the cost (and price) of their export commodities (based mainly on an abundant supply of natural resources and cheap labour) in order to pay for imported finished goods and capital equipment (based mainly on inputs of scarce capital and technology); the unequal distribution of surpluses reaped from these processes increasingly widened territorial disparities in living levels;

(5) it promoted inequalities between social strata, particularly in developing countries, as the required reduction in cost of export commodities had to be achieved mainly via the reduction of real wage inputs in order to pay for imports of consumption or capital goods required by a small regional or national élite;

(6) it promoted the extension of private or State capitalism through-out major parts of the world, as the "less developed" regions and countries, in order to close their capital and balance-of-payments gap, had to import capital or take on long-term loans and other (including political) commitments.

Economic interaction in fact seemed to have overcome distance friction as commodity and capital flows were able to reach the most remote corners of the globe. Aggregate economic growth and efficient use of scarce factors (particularly capital) advanced at a rate unheard of before. But territorially articulated "externalities" and others distributionally and structurally articulated (such as economic inequality, forceful transformations of political, cultural and social structures, fluctuations and disparities in level of employment of human and natural resources at national,regional and local levels) also exceeded any measure known before. A strong disintegration of territorially-organized communities and their environment, had taken place. Müller (1809) in fact had called Adam Smith's classical economics a theory of the successive and radical dissolution of the state.

Romanticism and the First Kondratieff Down-Swing :

It is therefore not surprising that the pendulum soon swung back again in the early 19th century. This swing coincided with what Kondratieff (1926) considered the first counter-wave after the upswing 1780 to 1810 . Parallel to this down-swing and reduction of interaction scales there occurred a change from the previous rationalistic conception of the economy and society (enlightenment, classical economics), to the more irrational and metaphysical conceptions of Romanticism (Figure 1) in Europe. There was substituted for the timeless and ubiquitous rationality of the previous period, a renewed emphasis on historical and territorial specificity (for example the German "historical" school of economics). The economy ceased to be considered as an autonomous field of activity, and was once more subordinated to normative societal and institutional constraints (e.g., by the "institutionalists" such as Thornstein Veblen in the U.S.A.). In contrast to the previous rationally-oriented period of the Enlightenment and of functionally-oriented classical economics, aestetic, irrational,

qualitative and structural elements - often defined in territorial terms - came to the foreground, such as man's relation to nature (Rousseau), Fichte's "Closed Commercial State" aiming at maximum resource mobilization for equal supply to all population strata; List's theory of broad intersectoral "mutually supporting" national economic development which, particularly for a country's intermediate agricultural-industrial transition phase, demanded the introduction of educational tariffs (List, 1840). There are many connections, by the way, between List's economic theory and self-reliant or "dissociative" development (Senghaas, 1977). Free trade was considered admissible only between countries at equal stages of economic development, and only once they had articulated internal structures which could retain the vital elements required for development, letting dissipate to the outside only the superavit. Otherwise, it was pointed out, free trade would cause external dependency and instability of production (Hildebrand, 1848; Lehr, 1877). Beyond monetary price and market conditions, the state has to consider the national future and long-range development of an integral societal system (Schmoller, 1873).

In contrast to the individualism dominant in the preceding period of classical economics, group solidarity again became an important objective and in this sense constituted a transition to subsequent Christian social (and also Communist social) theories of the second half of the 19th century and subsequent periods.

Christian - especially Catholic - social theory, in fairly consistent form over time starting from the encyclica "rerum novarum" of 1891 onward, has emphasized principles of solidarity and subsidiarity, both in spatial and social terms. In spatial terms this has manifested itself in a call for federalism, in social and economic terms in the preference for a "corporate" structure of society based on natural law (but not however dominated

by the state, in contrast to Fascism). Communist social theory was much more exposed to changes over time. From a socialism and communism very much "from below" in its early anarchic, utopian and co-operative forms, it has moved increasingly to a socialism "from above" in the form of state communism and Leninism, intended to operate not only from the national but also from the international level downward. It would be going far beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the complex development of theory and practice of these doctrines in more detail. However we have all more recently observed a tendency towards the lowering of the scale of societal reform to national (Euro-Communism) and even small-group levels, both in the East and West. Citizens' initiatives in East and West and the New Philosophers (particularly in France) rejecting the dominance of large-scale power, are symptomatic of this.

Kondratieff's Second Long Wave :

Returning to the earlier historical description, between 1850 and 1873 there occurred a rapid expansion both in spatial interaction scale and in economic growth along with Kondratieff's second up-swing (Figure 1), followed by the down-swing of 1873 to 1895, and a concurrent contraction of international trade.

Neo-Classical Era and Kondratieff's Third Long Wave :

From about 1895 up until the First World War came Kondratieff's third up-swing, coinciding with the neo-classical economic era (Figure 1).

World War I and the inter-war period of economic crises then led to an abrupt break-down of large-scale economic interactions, and to a trend towards national economic self-sufficiency (Hilgerdt, 1942), as well as towards increased intra-national political solidarity. This coincides with Kondratieff's third (1926) counterwave which in the event lasted until World War II (Figure 1).

For many developing countries the breakdown of the civilian overseas shipping network and the changeover of most industrialized countries to a war or crisis economy triggered import substitution and initial industrialization, thereby reinforcing intra-national economic circuits and intra-national interaction patterns.

Post-World War II Expansion

In the late 1950s there occurred, particularly in the capitalist hemisphere, a successive replacement of the foregoing dominantly-territorial approach, again by a functional one, both in economic and spatial development. This can be related to the efforts towards reconstruction of Europe after World War II, and to the emergence of neo-positivistic scientific thinking. It coincides with the projection of what would have been the up-swing in a new Kondratieff cycle, to begin around 1948 and last for about 25 years until about 1973 (Figure 1), at which time a new important turning-point would have had to be expected (Kaldor, 1977). It actually occurred in reality.

In economic development theory and practice this trend was initiated by Perroux (1955) in an attempt to show that the economy of nations (in this case the Germany of post-World War II) could grow not only by expanding their territorial borders but also by functional input-output relations across them with external dynamic sectors. Hansen (Chapter 2)[x] has excellently analyzed this evolution of functional thinking in economic theory which constituted the basis for centre-down development strategies. In the field of spatial development theory and practice, Friedmann and Weaver (1979) have related this transformation of theory and practice to the introduction of the concept of the urban system as a national network of interaction nodes (rather than the previous concern for individual cities), and to the definition of systems of growth centres through which development was expected to "filter down" to all parts of a national territory

x) see book-quotation on cover page.

(Berry, 1972). Friedmann and Weaver (1979) have also demonstrated in concrete terms how, in the U.S.A., regional planning has in the late 1950s shifted its major concern from contiguous territorial space to discrete functional space. In the last two chapters of their book Friedmann and Weaver present a similar finding for international development policy which, as they try to show, in the past decades has predominantly attempted to solve national and regional development problems and inequalities with what we here call strategies of development "from above".

This is where things stood around the middle of the 1970s. Since then the call for a reversal of development theory and practice which - as Friedmann and Weaver (1979) have shown - had already started at the end of the 1960s during the "Second Development Decade", became stronger and manifested in such thinking as the new periodical "Development Dialogue" (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, since 1975), in publications of the International Foundation for Development Alternatives (Geneva), in a great number of so-called "basic needs" strategies (however fuzzy the term may be) initiated several years ago by the International Labour Office, and successively introduced into the programmes of most international development organizations (such as the World Bank, the Continental Development Banks, the U.N. Regional Commissions and affiliated planning institutes - particularly those for Asia and Africa).

Large-scale organizations such as the World Bank and the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria) are trying to develop methods for a more balanced integration and maintenance of these complex systems by modelling approaches towards "Redistribution with Growth" (Chenery et al., 1977 and various successive applications of this model) and by the use of systems analysis (IIASA). A number of applied studies based on the "Redistribution with Growth" model come to the conclusion that the ultimate requirements for the successful application of such large-scale balancing strategies, are basic struc-

tural reforms within respective societies, accompanied by a redistribution of power,wealth and income (Adelman and Robinson, 1978) - but none of these analyses indicates how such crucial structural transformations are to be brought about.

There is at the same time an increasing call for more "self-reliant" development (however fuzzy this term also remains), initially for national units, but more recently for sub-national regional and even rural communities as well (Haque, Mehta et al., 1977).

These efforts are all rather diffuse still, and it is impossible to do them justice in the present context, but their features are becoming consistently clearer and more coherent, and may well lead to what Friedmann and Weaver (1979) have called the imminent paradigm shift in development thinking and the doctrine of spatial development. This shift in development thinking is most clearly and radically manifested in the Third World by the present strong Islamization of some Arab countries and their repudiation of both Western and Eastern rational value systems. It is symbolized in Europe by symptioms of a "new irrationalism", manifested for example by the New Philosophers who - comprising both former Marxist and Catholic personalities - oppose any kind of large-scale power structures, including the dominance of the State or of a positivistic science. These tie in with the European Romantic tradition of the nineteenth century and its protest against the State and a science made to dominate man (Coletti et al., 1978).

We have thus shown that development doctrine in the past has alternated between different combinations of development "from below" and "from above". Individual stages have at times gone to extremes on either side, and swung back again. This description does not intimate any historical determinism or any automatic (inescapable) historical periodicity; but there appears to be some association - though with varying intensity - between on the one hand predominantly rationally-

guided periods, rapid technological innovation, large-scale societal interaction patterns, large-scale formal organizations, emphasis on urban activities, a neglect of man-environment relations, a sub- or over-utilization of natural resources, and the decline of rural activities. These periods have features of what we here call development "from above".
On the other hand, predominantly non-rationally guided periods seem to be associated with control of technological innovation, a narrowing of societal interaction scale, a preference for informal organization, an emphasis on rural activities, love of landscape and nature, and a general emphasis on man-environment relations. These periods have many features in common with what is here called development "from below".

The swing from periods of development "from above" to those "from below" in many cases seems to have been prompted by one or several of the following phenomena:

(1) the extension of interaction and dominance scales beyond the conflict-resolving capacity of the society;

(2) the emergence of a few centres exerting decision-making powers over increasingly large areas pushed into dependency roles;

(3) resistance against pressure by the centres towards institutional and cultural penetration and uniformity;

(4) rapid increases in application of new technology to production processes and the transport media (Schumpeter, 1939), and the destabilizing effects these exert on societal structures (Laszlo, 1977);

(5) increasing disparities in living levels and wealth, in part objectively brought about by large-scale resource withdrawals and unequal benefits from commodity exchange, and in part subjectively caused by the increasing scale of communication and the ensuing trend towards uniformity of aspirations and preference patterns;

(6) changes in terms of trade between industry and agriculture to the disadvantage of the latter (explicitly shown for the Kondratieff down-swing 1873 to 1896, cf. Lewis, 1978, p.27);

(7) unequal or foreign utilization and the partial idleness of human, institutional and natural resources (resulting from over-utilization in some areas, and under-utilization in others); Axinn (1977) for example, considers the degree of integrated resource utilization as the major criterion for the under- or over-development of social systems);

(8) neglect of provision of basic needs for the whole population, and lack of broader systems-wide solidarity;

(9) increasing instability of systems due to lack of broader common societal norms.

Many of these points in fact are critical issues in today's world-wide problems. It is true that reversal of these trends in the past has often been accompanied by violence and bloodshed. This makes the early initiation of such changes all the more necessary, particularly if they are in the interests of the poor who make up the majority, before too great tensions have built up and while a smooth transition is still feasible.

We have dealt mainly in our analysis with the evolution of development doctrine in Europe. For long periods (at least until the end of the Middle Ages), the evolution of a comparable doctrine in other parts of the world may have followed different paths, and with varying cyclical time sequences, such as Silberman (1978) describes for Judaism and Axinn (1977) for ancient Hindu and Buddhist thinking. For the post-Colombian period in Mexico, such relations between economic/political variables and scales of territorial integration have been shown by Friedmann and Gardels (1979). From the time of the European Enlightenment, industrialization and Capitalist expansion however, the development doctrine of

Europe (and later of North America and the Soviet Union) penetrated more and more into other parts of the world and has led to a relatively small number of world-wide development paradigms, all essentially operating with mechanisms "from above".

The present demand of many materially less developed countries (as well as less developed sub-national areas and social groups) for more self-reliant development may in fact be an effort not only to escape from, or to change, the established economic and institutional channels of centre-down development, but also to change the present predominant value system oriented towards rationalistic and material objectives and steered by large-scale interaction and organizational systems.

This paradigm shift may be starting from the functional and geographic peripheries - far from the major nodes of the present global interaction system- which have been increasingly frustrated by this value system and the institutional structures sustaining it. Or is this just an idealistic notion of a few intellectuals in both industrialized and developing countries ? The broad pressure in this direction on the part of many sub-national, territorially-organized ethnic groups on a concerted multi-national basis even in the European periphery (Kiljunen, Schaffer, Seers, 1979) seems a sympton of broad political relevance. Such an alternative strategy of development "from below" might - at least for certain parts of the world (and possibly for a transitional period) be the only way to escape from a downward spiral of increasing disparities and under-development.

PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION FROM DEVELOPMENT "FROM ABOVE" TO DEVELOPMENT "FROM BELOW"

Most developing countries have historically been exposed to external interaction and colonial dependence, for varying length of time. The question therefore in most cases (except

possibly for some isolated pre-capitalist societies) is not how to start a new development "from below" (as some European and other countries have done in alternating stages centuries ago), but rather whether and how is it possible for developing countries and regions today to transform the past sectoral and spatial patterns of development "from above" to incorporate more elements of development "from below", and thereby reduce existing social and spatial disparities in levels of development. One of the problems of development "from below" is that there is neither a uniform concept to strive for nor a uniform transitional process to follow. Each country and region may therefore have to devise its own strategy, although some basic characteristics will be the same.

Recent development "from above" assumed that the ultimate objective for each country and region should be to reach a high degree of industrialization and urbanization resembling the structures of the most developed countries today, by a unilineal process of increasing the use of capital, technology and energy, and by utilizing ever-increasing agglomeration and scale economies in order to participate with increasing specialization in the world-wide market according to their comparative advantages in factor endowment, which in fact rarely occurs precisely in this fashion as Streeten (1974:262) and Stöhr and Tödtling (1978) indicate.

Alternatively, development "from below" means the instituting of a diversity of structural objectives and transition paths - as discussed earlier, with the broadest possible participation of the respective communities. Development "from below" however does not mean a negation of growth objectives which, in view of the great material needs particularly of poor population groups and regions in developing countries, would be irresponsible. It means instead basing growth on increased and integrated resource mobilization in a regional context rather than on selective

resource withdrawal under optimizing criteria derived from the world market.

The possibilities of changing formerly externally-oriented economic functional and geographic structures (e.g., urban and transport networks) to more region-serving and equitable ones will vary ·Developing regions or countries with a high degree of external interaction (and possibly dependence), with small internal markets but high-value saleable resources, may in fact need to proceed at an accelerated pace through the raw-material export - capital goods import - export diversification sequence (described by Paauw and Fei, 1973, for "small open economies" such as Taiwan and Thailand). Other larger regions - or countries with sizeable potential internal markets, few saleable resources and strong autochthonous cultural traits - might find the change to a more self-reliant development strategy not only easier but also more useful in solving their own problems (various regions of India are cases in point). Institutional constraints unfortunately may be inverse. In large countries it may be more difficult to change existing social and economic structures unless heavily populated regions are still not integrated into the national economic and political system (Goulet, 1979).

Equally, countries with strongly outward-oriented urban and transport systems may have more difficulty moving towards self-reliant development than countries with internally-oriented urban and transport systems. There seems to be a relatively strong relationship between the direction (inward or outward) of the dominant functional relations of an economic and social system and the spatial pattern of its urban and transport network (Appalraju and Safier, 1976; Taafe, Morrill, Gould, 1973). Some countries have already reacted, perhaps intuitively, to this fact and have taken drastic steps towards changing the spatial structure of their urban and transport network, e.g., by transferring their national capital from an outward-oriented (coastal) location to an inward-oriented, central one (e.g., Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan,

Tanzania), although this in itself does not mean that the functional system has also been transformed. It will be interesting to see from case studies what an impact the relocation of the national capitals in these countries has on changing the entire spatial structure of the urban system, economic relations, and the spatial disparities in living levels.

Finally, doubt is often expressed that societal change towards more egalitarian social, economic and political structures can be initiated from within local, regional or even national societies. External influence transmitted through contact with agents of external change is frequently considered a prerequisite for bringing about more egalitarian social, economic and political structures.

Contrarily, evidence that such change can also be initiated by internal forces is perhaps not so spectacular and therefore not as widely publicized as external intervention (an extreme of external influence); but such evidence exists. A few examples since World War II have been Yugoslavia, Cuba, Portugal and Spain, transformation in the first two taking place despite the opposition of neighbouring external powers, while in Iberia only some complementary support from outside functional units (national or international political parties, trade unions, church organizations) was received. In the many cases however where societal change has been induced by outside agents (mainly supported by one or other of the two "super-powers") it has not in fact led to more egalitarian structures, but rather to external imposition of a leading stratum as the link between the country and the external change agents in an effort to retain their influence. Such leading anti-egalitarian strata have been externally established both in capitalist and in socialist spheres of influence.

At the sub-national level similar conditions apply. National liberation movements have often gained decisive momentum from peripheral sub-national areas and from there have

reformed the entire national societal system. On the other hand many "revolutions" initiated in the national capital have soon led to petrified national power structures, extended over peripheral regions by nationally-appointed governors (even in formally-democratic federal systems as found in various Latin American countries), by central planners or by centrally-responsible regional administrators. It is therefore assumed that to operate in a sustained way, societal change towards more egalitarian structures, as well as towards broad economic, social and political development, has to be supported from within the social system. The fact that inward-motivated, "cellular" (Paine, 1976) or "segmentary" (Renfrew, 1973 b) societies can in fact have non-hierarchical, relatively egalitarian structures was demonstrated by the aforementioned authors for quite different time periods and geographic areas, as well as for earlier (precolonial) social patterns on the continents analyzed here, many of which are today called "under-developed". Examples are pre-capitalist agricultural societies in Asia (Haque et al., 1977), pp.16 and 51), in Africa (Brooks, 1971) and in some parts of pre-colonial Latin American societies (Clastres, 1974). Various case studies in this book [x] also refer to this fact (e.g., chapter 8, Conyers on Papua-New Guinea, and chapter 9, Blaikie on Nepal).

A STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT "FROM BELOW" FOR LEAST DEVELOPED REGIONS IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

The available evidence as quoted above indicates that traditional spatial development policies, (predominantly of the centre-down-and-outward type) in most cases have not been able - at least within a socially or politically tolerable time span - to improve or even stabilize living levels in the least-developed areas of Third World countries. Alternative spatial development strategies therefore should be urgently considered. The idea of solving problems of spatial disparities in living levels in Third World countries by increased urban-ward migration from peripheral areas has

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x) see book quotation on cover page

meanwhile been widely discarded in view of the utter futility of trying to absorb such masses of migrants into restricted urban labour markets, and supplying basic urban infrastructure and services for them.

As an alternative, the possibility of a development strategy "from below" is discussed in this chapter. It might be particularly suitable for the many areas which in the near future cannot expect to benefit from traditional "centre-down" development strategies. At the very least it can be used as a transitional strategy while competitiveness with the world economic system is improved, and it might be especially useful for sub-national peripheral (predominantly rural) areas with the following characteristics (Stöhr-Palme, 1977):

(1) contiguous less-developed (predominatly rural) areas with relatively large population size providing a potential internal market for basic services and commodities;

(2) a low per-capita resource base (natural resources or human skills) for world-wide demand;

(3) low living levels compared with other regions and distant from developed core regions;

(4) few internal dynamic urban centres able to absorb large rural populations into their labour market, infrastructure or service system;

(5) areas sufficiently different in socio-cultural aspects from their neighbours to have a regional identity of their own.

Development "from below" needs to be closely related to specific socio-cultural, historical and institutional conditions of the country and regions concerned. No uniform patent recipe for such strategies can be offered as is often done for strategies of development "from above". The guiding principle is that development of territorial units should be primarily based on full mobilization of their natural, human and institutional resources. In this context,

the following elements are seen as essential components of development strategies "from below":

(a) Provision of broad access to land and other territorially-available natural resources as the key production factors in most less-developed areas; in many pre-capitalist African, Asian and Latin American societies this was the case and sometimes still is, but it has been superseded since colonization by European systems of private land ownership. Retention or introduction of fairly equal access to land and natural resources (e.g., by land reform) seems an essential prerequisite for equalizing income, achieving broad effective demand for basic services, and creating broad rural decision-making structures, essential for development "from below".

(b) The introduction of new or revival of the old territorially-organized structures for equitable communal decision-making on the integrated allocation of regional natural and human resources. These territorially-organized communal decision-making processes would have to extend also to the processing of regional resources, to regional allocation of surpluses generated from these activities, and the introduction of regionally-adequate technologies (Goulet, 1979). Such structures for territorial governance should be established at different territorial levels and should operate on a mutual contracting basis (Friedmann, 1978, 1979), and the decision-making potential of lower territorial units should be exhausted before higher levels become involved.

(c) Granting a higher degree of self-determination to rural and other peripheral areas in the utilization or transformation of existing (or the creation of new) peripheral institutions to promote diversified peripheral development in line with self-determined objectives - instead of utilizing primarily-external institutions to promote development by externally-

defined (mainly core-region) needs and standards. This should lead to a greater balance between peripheral and core-region population groups in decision-making powers at all government levels. This should facilitate the retention in peripheral areas of a greater share of the surplus generated there, for the mobilization of own resources. An important role in this context could be played by "agropolitan districts" suggested by Friedmann and Douglass (1978).

(d) Choice of regionally adequate technology oriented towards minimizing waste of scarce, and maximizing use of regionally-abundant resources. For most less-developed areas such technology would therefore have to save capital and facilitate full employment of the region's human, institutional and natural resources, as well as taking careful note of regional cultural patterns and value systems.
It should furthermore contribute to the recuperation of renewable and the preservation of non-renewable natural resources in the region, which Furtado (1978) sees as a starting-point in the struggle against dependence. Idle regional resources should be used, with the priority being to improve local and regional infrastructure, possibly by community self-help. Regionally adequate technology should furthermore, according to the region's conditions, "be simple to learn and quickly implemented, and produce something for which there is a genuine demand (Vaccæ, 1978). The application of labour-intensive technology and the improvement of basic infrastructure will at the same time promote the creation of broad effective demand, as Lele (1975: p.189) suggests.

(e) Assignment of priority to projects which serve the satisfaction of basic needs of the population (food, shelter, basic services, etc.), using to a maximum regional resources and existing formal or informal societal structures. Such a priority - rather

than the one given presently to export-base production - would reduce dependence on outside inputs and the backwash effects caused by them discussed earlier in this chapter. Thus the strengthening of local and regional economic circuits is emphasized (Santos 1975) and the promotion of local and regional trade and service facilities for consumer goods and agricultural inputs, and regionally-based activities are stressed such as food processing, animal breeding, power supply, repair of agricultural machinery, etc., preferably by co-operative local or regional groups (Haque et al, 1977, p.64).

(f) The introduction of national pricing policies which offer terms of trade more favourable to agricultural and other typically peripheral products;

(g) In case of peripheral resources being insufficient for satisfaction of peripheral (e.g., rural) basic needs, external (national or international) assistance would be solicited but should be mainly considered as compensation for the eroding effects of previously emerging dependencies; this external assistance should be oriented mainly towards (1) the fuller productive utilization of peripheral human and natural resources, (2) the satisfaction of basic needs of the peripheral population, (3) the improvement of intra-peripheral transport and communication facilities, and (4) the formulation and implementation of locally-initiated social and economic projects for the further processing of peripheral resources and the satisfaction of basic needs; the allocation of such external assistance should be made with majority participation of local and regional decision-making bodies;

(h) Development of productive activities exceeding regional demand (so-called export-based activities) should be promoted only to the extent that they lead to a broad increase in living levels of the population of the territorial unit. Otherwise, "the monetary

wealth it can get in excess of the needs of national (regional, local) development stimulates conspicuous consumption, investment in . . . prestige projects, . . . moreover the surpluses are deposited or invested mainly in industrialized nations, regions or centres" (Abdalla, 1978). Priority should be given to activities which promote (1) full employment of regional labour and natural resources; (2) the application of technology to safeguard full employment of regional resources; (3) competitiveness in extra-regional markets by qualitative product differentiation, rather than by purely quantitative price competition in standardized mass production; (4) particular promotion should be given to small-scale labour-intensive activities in rural areas, building on autochthonous technologies or developing them further, as these usually permit the most efficient use of all locally-available resources, a maximization of output with available resources, the greatest adaptability to specific regional demand, and broad distribution of the income generated; (5) if competitiveness on external markets seems to require introduction of large-scale technology, the adaptation of locally- or regionally-available technology and improvement of local production conditions by local resource inputs (including communal self-help) should be attempted first.

(j) Restructuring of urban and transport system to improve and equalize access of the population in all parts of the country to them, rather than strengthening such systems oriented to the outside. If both these systems are heavily oriented externally, this may require a relocation of major urban functions (including national government) from peripheral (e.g., coastal) locations to the interior of the country. This should also apply to intermediate-level functions and the improvement of intra-regional accessibility within peripheral areas in order to improve their

relative starting position. In case of competing demands between such functions at national and sub-national levels, preference would have to be given to the improvement of intermediate urban functions in peripheral areas (e.g., educational facilities oriented to specific regional development potentials) able to retain development impulses within the region, rather than giving priority to national functions and national transport integration which might drain development potential into the core regions.

(j) Improvement of rural-to-rural and rural-to-village transport and communications facilities (rather than the present priority given to rural-to-large-urban communications) should have preference, in order to (1) increase commodity and service markets within peripheral areas - thus permitting realization of economies of scale and a better supply of basic services to all parts of the population, (2) increase the scale and diversity of factor markets within peripheral areas in order to reduce production costs, and thereby (3) facilitate increased processing, purchasing and marketing activities in peripheral areas sustained by peripheral groups, and a more decentralized national pattern of capital accumulation with greater participation of peripheral areas.

(k) Egalitarian societal structures and a collective consciousness are important prerequisites for a strategy for development "from below". They should by preference be retained or initiated through internal (local or regional) initiative. Where this is not possible, external support may be necessary. This applies at different levels of society, such as the level of the small group (basic rights of children, women, etc.), or that of local or regional units (reduction of the power of vested territorial interest groups). Where such external support "from above" is necessary it should be facilitated, both between

and within countries, preferably on a non-government basis, through ideological or religious groups, organizations of committed intellectuals, through "link cadres" (Haque et al., 1977), or Independent Volunteer Cadres (Monlik, 1979) - as local or regional government representatives will tend to feel responsible to their hierarchical superiors rather than to their target groups (Haque et al., 1977).

ON THE FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPMENT "FROM BELOW"

The most frequent reaction to proposals like the above, even from professionals open to change, is one of "scepticism about the concrete possibility of implementing such an attractive change of world conditions" (Vera Cao-Pinna, personal communication, Nov.1978).

There is nothing more convincing than reality. Let me therefore point to some instances where approaches similar to those proposed above have actually been implemented with some success. Most of these examples are on a relatively small regional scale at sub-national level. Experiences on such a small scale are usually not recorded centrally - much in line with the macro-structure of our dominant information systems - and in fact many more probably exist all over the world. Only recently, institutions such as the International Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA), Geneva, or the International Research Center on Environment and Development (CIRED) in Paris, have started to collect and report systematically on such efforts of small-scale alternative development. Further examples are given by Lo and Salih (Chapter 5). x)

Here are some examples which have been more systematically reported upon : In Asia the Santhal Movement in Bihar, India (Haque, Mehta et al., 1977: p.20 ff.), based mainly on local common use of implements and labour and on common local contributions in kind for night school, political activities, etc.;

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x) see book quotation on cover page

The Bhoomi Sena (Land Army) movement by some groups of the Adivasi aboriginal inhabitants of India who in total comprise about 50 million people (Silva, Mehta et al., 1979), based mainly on regaining access to land, the abolition of bonded labour and creation of village forums;

The Rangpur Self-reliant Movement in Bangladesh (Haque et al., 1977, p.32 ff.), based mainly on communal decision-making on the use of land and its proceeds, on the communal purchase of agricultural inputs, the reduction of dependence from external loans, and communal labour for economic infrastructure;

The Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement in Sri Lanka (Goulet, 1979, p.6), based on student volunteer participation in local infrastructure work and on motivating local community deliberation and action;

The Quechua Alto Valle co-operatives in central Bolivia (Goulet, 1979), oriented mainly towards the co-operative production of woolen products and ceramics; the decisions of the co-operative are subordinated to the broader interests and values of the entire territorial community: this restricts the introduction of new technologies to those "which are in harmony with ancient Quechua rural values of mutual help and sharing the benefits in all improvements", and to "assigning a share of the surplus to all members of the village, whether they belong to the co-operative or not". (Goulet, 1979, p.13).

An Agricultural Development Project for the Altiplano in the Peruvian province of Puno (Morlon, 1978), oriented towards mobilizing the endogenous development potential of large highland areas and their agricultural and forest resources (including agricultural infrastructure such as extensive terraces, etc.) which have become depleted by changes in the natural and in the social environment (including the take-over by large sheep-breeding "haciendas").

Different programmes for the evolution of rural space in mountain areas and unproductive Mediterranean regions of the Pyrenees and various other French regions (Poly, 1977)

involving the integrated transformation of agrarian structures, land-use policies and modifications in production systems oriented mainly towards sylvo-pastoral activities; similar programmes are being undertaken by Longo Mai co-operatives in Costa Rica based on experiences of this international group of co-operatives in Mountain areas of the French Provence, of Switzerland and southern Austria.

Many of these examples are explicitly built on autochthonous value systems and principles of community collaboration, decision-making and the sharing of proceeds. In a number of them, for example in the Quechua co-operatives of Bolivia, rational decisions such as the introduction of new technologies, are explicitly subordinated to the community's wider and more basic cultural needs (Goulet, 1979, p.13).

Most of these examples are relatively small in scale, although some of them are spreading to neighbouring areas or to other communities suffering from similar phenomena of under-development in their present relations with the outside economy. Such movements "generated internally from within ... their own experience (of the daily life of its villagers) are like bubbles that will disappear and tend to be forgotten unless external forces ... sustain them" (Haque, Mehta et al., 1977, p.35). Lack of support from higher levels (particularly national) may be a major reason why such examples have hardly developed on a larger scale (except temporarily in China). A recent case where autochthonous local development appears to be successfully supported by the state is in West Bengal in India, via the reformed revival of traditional local panchayat institutions (Marshall, 1979). While general support needs to come from national governments, concrete action should preferably come from independent groups such as "committed link-cadres" (Haque, Mehta et al., 1977,p.61) as mentioned above. The major limiting factor for expansion of such initiatives today seems to be fear of central (national or international) decision-making centres that they might lose control and their competitive efficiency vis-à-vis other states, enterprises or power blocks.

Does this mean that the success of development "from below" will to a great extent hinge - even if more equitable social structures can be achieved at different sub-national and national levels - on the reduction of international tension and competition, particularly between superpowers, and successively also between nation-states, regions, and ultimately between individuals ?

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